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Abstract
Following Mongin [12, 13], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility
preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage’s P3 and P4 are
incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social
preferences satisfying Pareto indiﬀerence and conforming to the state-dependent expected
utility model is provided.
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1 Introduction
Harsanyi’s theorem [8] discusses social aggregation of individual preferences in a risky
environment. He shows that when all agents’ preferences conform to the axioms of
expected utility, if social preference also conforms to the axioms of expected utility and
satisfies Pareto indiﬀerence with respect to agents’ preferences, then social preference can
be represented as a weighted sum of agents’ expected utility functions.1 An example due
to Diamond [5] illustrates that Harsanyi’s assumptions on social preference may not be
compelling.
Formalizing ideas found in Raiﬀa [15], Mongin [12, 13] pursues a similar program
within Savage’s [16] framework of subjective uncertainty. If all agents behave according
to Savage’s axioms, he shows that it is generally impossible for social preference to
jointly satisfy Savage’s axioms and the strong Pareto property with respect to individual
preferences. Two natural responses to this negative conclusion present themselves, both
of which were first suggested by Raiﬀa [15]. One is to condemn the strong Pareto property
in a setting of subjective uncertainty. Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler [7] discuss this
approach, see also Broome [3]. The other approach is to condemn Savage’s axioms for
social preference. Implicit in most examples which condemn one of these assumptions
is the idea that social preference should satisfy the other of the assumptions. In the
words of Raiﬀa, “These issues can be dramatized as a fight between Group Bayesians
and Paretians” ([15], p. 234). For a related result, see Hylland and Zeckhauser [9].
Our approach is to understand the basic structure generating the impossibility results,
by studying social and individual preferences at an axiomatic level. At an individual
∗Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail Code 228-77, California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, CA 91125. Email: chambers@hss.caltech.edu. Phone: (626) 395-3559 and Department of
Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester NY, 14627. Email: taka@troi.cc.rochester.edu. We would
like to thank Philippe Mongin and John Weymark for many very helpful comments and suggestions. We
would also like to thank Larry Epstein and William Thomson, for many helpful discussions. All errors
are our own.
1For more on Harsanyi’s theorem, see Mongin and D’Aspremont [14] and Weymark [18].
level, Savage’s axioms are used to deliver a personal notion of probability. The primary
axioms in his theory are P2 (sure-thing principle), P3 (eventwise monotonicity), and P4
(weak comparative probability).2 In terms of empirical violations of Savage’s theory at
an individual level, P2 is often criticized. We have no specific criticism against assuming
P2 at a social level.
Instead, we discuss P3 and P4. We show by examples that each of these axioms
conflicts with the strong Pareto property on its own. Thus, our examples generate
impossibility results for a large class of social preferences (for example, social preferences
that are probabilistically sophisticated, as defined by Machina and Schmeidler [11]).
Informally, each of P3 and P4 carry with them notions of state-independence, which can
be understood as the source of the impossibility results.
Our work concludes by studying the most well-known model which generically violates
P3 and P4, the state-dependent expected utility model. Arguing that state-independence
of social preference is the primary factor driving the impossibility results, Mongin [13]
conducts a similar exercise in the Anscombe-Aumann [1] and Karni, Schmeidler, and
Vind [10] frameworks. Our theorem gives a counterpart of these results in the Savage
framework.
We provide a representation theorem for social preference conforming to the state-
dependent model and which satisfies Pareto indiﬀerence with respect to individual prefer-
ences. Under Pareto indiﬀerence, social preference can be represented by a weighted sum
of individual utility representations. This result is the natural analogue of Harsanyi’s
theorem [8] in the Savage framework. Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler [7] obtain a related
result by weakening the Pareto property so that it holds only when all agents in society
agree about the likelihood of “relevant” events. Whereas we weaken Savage’s axioms as
little as possible to obtain a possibility and representation result, they maintain Savage’s
axioms and weaken the Pareto property as little as possible to obtain a possibility and
representation result.
Section 2 describes the model and provides examples and propositions illustrating
the conflict between Savage’s axioms and the Pareto properties. Section 3 provides a
representation theorem in a state-dependent expected utility framework. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
2 The model and Savage’s axioms
Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, where S is a set of states and Σ is a σ-algebra of
events. We use s to denote a generic state and A or B to denote generic events. Let
X be a set of outcomes. Define the set of (simple) acts F as the set of finite-ranged
Σ-measurable mappings f : S → X. We use f or g to denote a generic act. For x, y ∈ X,
2The terminology is from Machina and Schmeidler [11].
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A ∈ Σ, define xAy ∈ F as
xAy ≡
µ
x if s ∈ A
y if s ∈ Ac
¶
.
With a slight abuse of notation, x ∈ X also denotes the act whose constant outcome is
x.
Savage’s axioms apply to binary relations º on F . Say that A ∈ Σ is null for º if
for all x ∈ X and all f ∈ F ,
f ∼
µ
x if s ∈ A
f (s) otherwise
¶
.
For a set of agents N ≡ {1, ..., n}, agent i’s preference is denoted by ºi and social
preference is denoted by º0. Say that º0 satisfies Pareto-indiﬀerence with respect
to (º1, ...,ºn) if for all f, g ∈ F , if for all i ∈ N , f ∼i g, then f ∼0 g. Say that º0
satisfies the weak Pareto property with respect to (º1, ...,ºn) if for all f, g ∈ F ,
if for all i ∈ N , f Âi g, then f Â0 g. Say that º0 satisfies the strong Pareto
property with respect to (º1, ...,ºn) if it satisfies Pareto indiﬀerence with respect
to (º1, ...,ºn) and if for all i ∈ N , f ºi g, with strict preference for some j ∈ N , then
f Â0 g.
A function U : F → R is a subjective expected utility functional if there
exists a nonatomic, countably additive3 probability measure µ on (S,Σ) and a function
u : X → R such that for all f ∈ F , U (f) = R
S
u (f (s)) dµ (s). Say a binary relation º is
a subjective expected utility preference if there exists a subjective expected utility
functional U such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f º g ⇔ U (f) ≥ U (g) .
For any such U representing a nondegenerate subjective expected utility preference, the
associated probability measure µ is unique, and the function u is unique up to positive
aﬃne transformation.
2.1 P3: Eventwise monotonicity
Savage’s axiom P3 states:
P3 For all non-null A ∈ Σ, x, y ∈ X, f ∈ F ,
x º y ⇔
µ
x if s ∈ A
f (s) if s ∈ Ac
¶
º
µ
y if s ∈ A
f (s) if s ∈ Ac
¶
.
3Savage’s theorem [16] only delivers a finitely additive probability measure. Arrow [2] discusses
conditions which guarantee that the probability measure is countably additive.
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A social preference that satisfies P3 cannot generally satisfy the weak Pareto property.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1 Let N ≡ {1, 2} and X ≡ R2+. The set X represents distributions of wealth
amongst the two agents. Let º0 be a social preference over F . Assuming each
agent likes more wealth to less and cares only about her own wealth, a plausible
social ranking is (0, 100) ∼0 (100, 0). Let A,Ac ∈ Σ. Suppose agent one believes A
is more likely than Ac and agent two believes Ac is more likely than A. Then for
i = 1, 2,
(100, 0)A (0, 100) Âi (0, 100)A (100, 0) .
By the weak Pareto property,
(100, 0)A (0, 100) Â0 (0, 100)A (100, 0) .
Here, º0 violates P3. To see this, suppose º0 satisfies P3. As (100, 0) ∼0 (0, 100),
and as º0 satisfies P3,
(100, 0) ∼0 (100, 0)A (0, 100)
and
(0, 100)A (100, 0) ∼0 (0, 100) .
By transitivity, the ranking (100, 0) Â0 (0, 100) holds, a contradiction.
2.2 P4: Weak comparative probability
Savage’s axiom P4 states:
P4 For all x, x, y, y such that x Â x and y Â y, for all A,B ∈ Σ
xAx Â xBx⇔ yAy Â yBy.
Example 2 shows that P4 is also incompatible with the strong Pareto property.
Example 2 LetN ≡ {1, 2} andX ≡ R2+, where the numerical quantities again represent
monetary values. Each agent only cares about the amount she receives. Suppose
again that agent one believes A is more likely than Ac, and agent two believes Ac
is more likely than A. By strong Pareto, (100, 0) Â0 (0, 0) and (0, 100) Â0 (0, 0).
Thus,
(100, 0)A (0, 0) Â1 (0, 0)A (100, 0)
and
(100, 0)A (0, 0) ∼2 (0, 0)A (100, 0) .
By the strong Pareto property,
(100, 0)A (0, 0) Â0 (0, 0)A (100, 0) .
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By a symmetric argument,
(0, 100)A (0, 0) ≺0 (0, 0)A (0, 100) .
These rankings clearly violate P4. The structure of this example is closely related
to an example found in Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler [7]. It formally illustrates
the reasoning which may lead one to reject the Pareto principle.
2.3 General incompatibility results
The following propositions are general versions of the examples.
The first proposition follows directly from Example 1. For any preference relation º
satisfying P4, a likelihood relation ºl on Σ can be defined as follows: A ºl B if and
only if there exist x, x0 ∈ X such that x Â x0 and xAx0 º xBx0.4
Proposition 1: Suppose º1 and º2 satisfy P4 and for all i = 1, 2, A ºli B ⇔ Bc ºli Ac.
Suppose there exist x, x ∈ X such that x Â1 x, x Â2 x, and x ∼0 x. If º0 satisfies
P3 and the strong Pareto property with respect to (º1,º2), then ºl1=ºl2.
The next proposition illustrates a related point. If individuals’ “beliefs” are diﬀerent,
then aggregation under the strong Pareto property and P3 is possible only if their “tastes”
are the same.
Proposition 2: Suppose º1 and º2 satisfy P3 and that there exist x, x, y, y such that
x Â1 x and y Â2 y. Suppose there exist A ∈ Σ such that A is non-null for º1
and null for º2, and B ∈ Σ such that B is non-null for º2 and null for º1. If º0
satisfies P3 and satisfies the strong Pareto property with respect to (º1,º2), then
º1 |X =º2 |X .
Proof: We first show that each of A and B is non-null for º0. As º1 satisfies P3
and A is non-null for º1, xAx Â1 x. As A is null for º2, xAx ∼2 x. By the strong Pareto
property, xAx Â0 x, so that A is non-null for º0. The proof for B is symmetric.
Suppose the statement of the proposition is false. Thus, º1 |X 6=º2 |X , and without
loss of generality, there exist x, y ∈ X such that x º1 y and y Â2 x. As º1 satisfies P3,
xAy º1 y, and as A is null for º2, xAy ∼2 y. By the strong Pareto property, xAy º0 y.
As A is non-null for º0, by P3, x º0 y.
As º2 satisfies P3 and as B is non-null for º2, y Â2 xBy, and as B is null for agent
º1, y ∼1 xBy. By the strong Pareto property, y Â0 xBy. As B is non-null for º0, by
P3, y Â0 x. But we previously concluded that x º0 y, a contradiction.¥
The last proposition follows directly from Example 2.
4Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are stated for environments with only two agents. Similar results can be
established for any number of agents, by partitioning the set of agents into two types, where each type
has a preference relation corresponding to one of the two preference relations in the propositions.
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Proposition 3: Suppose º1 and º2 satisfy P4 and for all i = 1, 2, for all x, x0 ∈ X,
A,B ∈ Σ,
x ∼i x0 =⇒ xAx0 ∼i xBx0.
Suppose there exist x, x, y, y ∈ X such that x Â1 x,x ∼2 x, y ∼1 y, y Â2 y. If º0
satisfies P4 and the strong Pareto property with respect to (º1,º2), then ºl1=ºl2.5
3 A possibility result
Each of P3 and P4 can be thought of as requirements of state-independence. Thus, in this
section, we show that if social preference is not required to satisfy P3 and P4, Paretian
aggregation is possible under the state-dependent expected utility model. To this end,
say U : F → R is a state-dependent subjective expected utility functional if there
exists a nonatomic, countably additive probability measure µ on (S,Σ) and a function
u : X×S → R such that for all x ∈ X, u (x, ·) : S → R is Σ-measurable and µ-integrable
and for all f ∈ F , U (f) = R
S
u (f (s) , s) dµ (s). Say a binary relation º is a state-
dependent subjective expected utility preference if there exists a state-dependent
subjective expected utility functional U such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f º g ⇔ U (f) ≥ U (g) .
For more information about state-dependent subjective expected utility preferences, see
Wakker and Zank [17].
The probability measure component of a state-dependent subjective expected utility
functional is not unique. Hence, we cannot refer to society’s “beliefs” in an unambiguous
way. This is an artifact of the incompatibility of P4 with Paretian aggregation.
Theorem 1: Suppose that for all i ∈ N , ºi is a subjective expected utility preference
represented by Ui : F → R. Then º0 is a state-dependent subjective expected
utility preference which satisfies Pareto-indiﬀerence with respect to (º1, ...,ºn) if
and only if there exists a vector λ ∈ RN such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f º0 g ⇔
X
N
λiUi (f) ≥
X
N
λiUi (g) .
Representations corresponding to stronger Pareto properties can similarly be derived
using Lemma 1 of Appendix A and the general representation theorems of DeMeyer
and Mongin [4]. Mongin [13] proves a related theorem using the added structure of
the Anscombe-Aumann [1] framework. He also showed in [12] that if the probability
5We could replace the hypothesis x Â1 x,x ∼2 x, y ∼1 y, y Â2 y with the hypothesis that x Â1
x,x ¹2 x,x Â0 x, y ¹1 y, y Â2 y,y Â0 y. The first of these hypotheses derives the social preference in
the second hypothesis from the strong Pareto property.
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measures of all agents and society can have atoms, then Theorem 1 does not hold in a
Savage setup. Theorem 1 is closely related to Harsanyi’s original result [8], in that it
is driven by the sure-thing principle (which is closely tied to the independence axiom
of expected utility theory which drives Harsanyi’s result). In fact, Harsanyi’s Theorem
should be viewed as a special case of our Theorem 1, where social preference satisfies
Savage’s axioms and the likelihood relations of all agents and of society coincide.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix. In order to prove Theorem 1, we es-
tablish in Lemma 1 that the utility possibilities set for a collection of state-dependent
expected utility maximizers is convex, a fact which comes for free in the Anscombe-
Aumann model. After establishing this, we apply a general representation theorem of
DeMeyer and Mongin [4].
4 Conclusion
Mongin’s [12] negative results make clear that Paretian aggregation is incompatible with
the expected utility model for social preference. Going further, he also suggests the
idea that the problem with Paretian aggregation is the state-dependence of preferences
satisfying Savage’s axioms [13]. Our first contribution is to work at a primitive level,
identifying exactly which of Savage’s axioms are the source of the negative results. We
determine that two of Savage’s axioms are incompatible with Paretian aggregation—P3
and P4. Our second contribution is to demonstrate the possibility of Paretian aggregation
without P3 and P4 by providing a representation for social preference conforming to the
state-dependent expected utility model.
5 Appendix—Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 establishes that the utility possibility set for a collection of state-dependent
expected utility maximizers is convex. This result relies on a generalization of Lyapunov’s
Convexity Theorem, due to Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfovitz [6].
Lemma 1: Suppose (U1, ..., Um) is a vector of state-dependent expected utility function-
als. Then
{(U1 (f) , ..., Um (f)) : f ∈ F}
is convex.
Proof: We need to show that for all f, g ∈ F , α ∈ [0, 1], there exists some h ∈ F
such that for all i = 1, ...,m, Ui (h) = αUi (f) + (1− α)Ui (g).
Therefore, let f∗, g∗ ∈ F , α∗ ∈ [0, 1].
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Let X (f∗, g∗) ≡ (range (f∗)) ∪ (range (g∗)). As f∗, g∗ are simple acts, |X (f∗, g∗)| <
∞. Let F (f∗, g∗) ⊂ F be the set of acts whose range lies in X (f∗, g∗).
By assumption, for all i = 1, ...,m, there exists ui : X ×S → R and µi on (S,Σ) such
that Ui (f) ≡
R
S
ui (f (s) , s) dµi (s). For all i = 1, ...,m, and for all x ∈ X (f∗, g∗), let νxi
be a measure on Σ defined by
νxi (E) ≡
Z
E
ui (x, s) dµi (s) .
Then for all i ∈ N , x ∈ X (f∗, g∗), νxi is countably additive, nonatomic, and finite.6 By
definition of the integral, for all i ∈ N , f ∈ F (f∗, g∗)
Ui (f) =
X
x∈X(f∗,g∗)
νxi
¡
f−1 (x)
¢
.
Let Π be the set of Σ-measurable ordered X (f∗, g∗)-partitions. Formally, Π is defined
as the set of functions P : X (f∗, g∗)→ Σ satisfying i)
S
X(f∗,g∗) P (x) = S and ii) for all
x, y ∈ X (f∗, g∗) such that x 6= y, P (x) ∩ P (y) = ∅.
Clearly, there is a bijection ψ between F (f∗, g∗) and Π, given by for all f ∈ F (f∗, g∗)
and for all x ∈ X (f∗, g∗), ψ (f) (x) ≡ f−1 (x). In particular,
A ≡
n
(νxi (P (x)))i,x ⊂ Rm×X(f
∗,g∗) : P ∈ Π
o
is equal to
B ≡
n¡
νxi
¡
f−1 (x)
¢¢
i,x
⊂ Rm×X(f∗,g∗) : f ∈ F (f∗, g∗)
o
.
By Theorems 1 and 4 of Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz [6], it follows that A is convex.7
Thus B is also convex.
By summing the columns of the elements of B, we obtain
{(U1 (f) , ..., Um (f)) : f ∈ F (f∗, g∗)}. Convexity is preserved under this summa-
tion. Lastly, note that {(Ui (f∗))i , (Ui (g∗))i} ⊂ {(U1 (f) , ..., Um (f)) : f ∈ F (f∗, g∗)}.
Thus, there exists some h ∈ F (f∗, g∗) such that for all i = 1, ...,m,
Ui (h) = α
∗Ui (f
∗) + (1− α∗)Ui (g∗).
6To see that νxi is nonatomic, suppose that it is not. Then there exists some E ∈ Σ such that
νxi (E) > 0, and for all F ⊂ E, νxi (F ) ∈ {0, νxi (E)}. Let {Em}∞m=1 be a sequence such that E1 = E,
and for all m, Em ⊂ Em−1, µi (Em) = 12µi (Em−1), and ν
x
i (Em) = ν
x
i (E). By countable additivity,
µi (
T∞
m=1Em) = 0 and ν
x
i (
T∞
m=1Em) = ν
x
i (E) > 0, a contradiction. Finiteness follows as ui (x, ·) is
µi-integrable.
7This follows as Theorems 1 and 4 of Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz imply thatn
(νxi (P (y)))(i,x),y ⊂ R(m×X(f
∗,g∗))×X(f∗,g∗) : P ∈ Π
o
is convex. The set A is a projection of this set
on the subspace in which x = y.
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We now prove the theorem.
Proof: It is obvious that if there exists a vector λ ∈ RN such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f º0 g ⇔
P
N λiUi (f) ≥
P
N λiUi (g), then º0 satisfies Pareto indiﬀerence with respect
to (º1, ...,ºn). We will now show that it is a state-dependent subjective expected utility
preference. If for all f, g ∈ F , f ∼0 g, then the claim is obvious. So, assume there exist
f 0, g0 ∈ F such that f 0 Â0 g0.
For all i ∈ N , Ui has two components, a utility index ui, and a probability measure
µi. Let µ ≡
P
N µi
|N | . Then µ is a probability measure defined on (S,Σ). For all i ∈ N ,
µi is absolutely continuous with respect to µ. By the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, for all
i ∈ N , there exists a Σ-measurable, µ-integrable function hi : S → R such that for all
f ∈ F , Z
S
ui (f (s)) dµi (s) =
Z
S
ui (f (s))hi (s) dµ (s) .
Thus, for all f ∈ F ,
X
N
λiUi (f) =
Z
S
ÃX
N
λiui (f (s))hi (s)
!
dµ (s) .
Let u : X × S → R be defined by
u (x, s) ≡
X
N
λiui (x)hi (s) .
Thus, for all x ∈ X, u (x, ·) is Σ-measurable and µ-integrable, and for all f ∈ F ,X
N
λiUi (f) =
Z
S
u (f (s) , s) dµ (s) .
Conversely, suppose that for all i ∈ N , ºi is a subjective expected utility preference.
Suppose thatº0 is a state-dependent subjective expected utility preference which satisfies
Pareto indiﬀerence with respect to (º1, ...,ºn).
For all i ∈ N , let Ui : F → R be a subjective expected utility functional representing
ºi, and U0 a state-dependent subjective expected utility functional representing º0. By
Lemma 1 above and Proposition 1 of DeMeyer and Mongin [4], there exist λ ∈ RN and
K ∈ R such that for all f ∈ F ,
U0 (f) = K +
X
N
λiUi (f) .
Thus, for all f, g ∈ F , f º0 g if and only if K +
P
N λiUi (f) ≥ K +
P
N λiUi (g).
Equivalently, f º0 g if and only if
P
N λiUi (f) ≥
P
N λiUi (g).
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